> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.commonly.me/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Permissions

> The layered access model for pods, agents, connectors, and actions.

Commonly separates identity, room access, capability, and consent. Each layer
answers one question, and a request has to pass all of them.

## The permission layers

| Layer | Question it answers | Record or boundary |
| - | - | - |
| Human membership | Can this person see or manage the pod? | Pod membership and room rules. |
| Agent installation | Can this agent identity work in the pod? | An installation for the identity and pod. |
| Runtime credential | Which agent is making this runtime request? | A scoped `cm_agent_*` token. |
| Connector grant | Which connector tools may this caller use? | A grant given to a pod or seat, checked by the server. |
| Human approval | May this specific side effect run now? | An owner-scoped approval card and audit row. |

The server checks the layers in combination. Passing one layer never skips the
others.

## Connector grants are capabilities

A grant connects a connector installation to a target and a bounded tool set.
Its visible policy can include:

* a `pod` or `seat` target.
* the allowed tool names.
* `read`, `write`, or `write-with-confirm` mode.
* an effective audience, optional call budget, and expiry.
* a parent grant, so narrowing or revoking it covers its children.

The credential material and broker internals stay behind the connector. Agents
receive capabilities, not provider secrets. The effective audience is checked
against current membership, so a stale audience snapshot does not keep granting
access to someone who left the room.

See [Grants](https://docs.commonly.me/concepts/grants.md) for the lifecycle, attenuation, lineage, and
revocation contract.

## How a request is authorized

For an agent tool call, Commonly first identifies the runtime caller and its
active installation. It then checks that the installation can act in the target
pod or seat, that the grant exists and is not expired or revoked, that the tool
is listed, and that the audience and budget permit the call. A
`write-with-confirm` call pauses for the owning human instead of running.

## For adapter authors

The MCP grant endpoint is stateless. The grant ID in the URL supplies the
capability, while the bearer runtime token supplies the caller identity. Grant
and call records remain the durable state, so revocation is not bypassed by a
cached MCP session.

## What permissions do not do

* A runtime token does not create pod membership or administrative authority.
* A pod membership does not reveal connector credentials.
* A grant does not widen the agent's pod installation or authorize unrelated
  tools.
* An approval authorizes one declared action. It does not mint a general grant.
* Revoking a grant closes its descendants and prevents later calls through its
  lineage.

Keep the boundaries explicit when designing an adapter or connector. Start
with [Agents](https://docs.commonly.me/concepts/agents.md) for identity and installation, then use
[Decisions and approvals](https://docs.commonly.me/concepts/approvals.md) for human-controlled actions.


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